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The German-Italian dispute over the scope of sovereign immunities and claims of 
reparations for war crimes committed by German armed forces during World War II in 
Italy is in many ways specific and historically contingent. At the same time, it touches 
upon a number of fundamental challenges which the international community has to 
address in the interest of furthering the international rule of law. In this working paper 
both authors adress the question whether the current law of sovereign immunities 
should be changed or interpreted in a manner as to allow for exceptions from State 
immunities in cases of grave violations of human rights. While the first part of the paper 
focusses on the perspective of general international law the second part adresses the 
question through the lense of European law. Both authors agree that unilateral efforts to 
push for what many consider a progressive development of international law actually 
may entail adverse effects for the international rule of law and thus may even contribute 
to a broader crisis of the international legal order.  
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Part I: Sentenza 238/2014 - A good case for law-reform? 
Heike Krieger1 
1. Introduction 
The German-Italian dispute over the scope of sovereign immunities and claims of reparations for 
war crimes committed by German armed forces during World War II in Italy is in many ways specific 
and historically contingent. At the same time, it touches upon a number of fundamental challenges 
which the international community has to address in the interest of furthering the international 
rule of law. For many observers the case represents injustices and inconsistencies inherent in the 
international legal order and thus seems to contribute to its legitimacy deficits. They doubt that a 
legal order can be considered as a just order which hampers redress against serious human rights 
violations before national courts in the interest of an abstract legal concept, such as sovereign 
equality protected through State immunity. Moreover, they criticize a consistency deficit if the ius 
cogens character of a violated rule does not also affect relevant procedural rules. 2 Such a 
perspective furthers the idea to lift the case beyond the concrete details and context and take it as 
a plea for changing the rules on State immunity. For other observers the case reflects the growing 
challenges international law faces from unilateral acts of non-compliance by national courts in the 
interest of the protection of national constitutional law.3 Brought together both perspectives raise 
the question whether and to what extent national courts can contribute in a balanced manner to 
changes of international law which they consider to be necessary. Thus, Sentenza 238 utters the 
hope that it „may also contribute to a desirable – and desired by many – evolution of international 
law itself.”4 But is Sentenza 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court a good case for law-reform? 
Sentenza 238/2014 denied German immunity from civil jurisdiction against claims arising from war 
crimes committed by German armed forces during World War II. The Court argued that the 
customary international law rule of State immunity in such cases violated fundamental principles 
of the Italian Constitution. Therefore the Court struck down the Italian Law No. 5 of 2013 which had 
aimed to execute the 2012 judgment of the ICJ in the Jurisdictional Immunities Case5 as well as the 
law which implements the UN Charter in relation to Art. 94 UN Charter and the respective ICJ 
judgment. In this judgment the ICJ had uphold the customary rule of jurisdictional immunities 
without any exceptions for claims arising from war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
The creation of customary international law rules through judicial practice may be a means to 
overcome the opposition of the State executive to further legal development since judicial reliance 
                                                        
1 Professor of Law, Freie Universität Berlin; Max Planck Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
Public Law and International Law. 
2 E.g. A. Orakhelashvili, `Jurisdictional Immunities of the State` (2012) 106 AJIL 609, at 614 and 615. 
3 E.g. A. Peters, `Let Not Triepel Triumph – How To Make the Best Out of Sentenza No. 238 of the Italian 
Constitutional Court for a Global Legal Order´ EJIL Talk, 22 December 2014; https://www.ejiltalk.org/let-not-
triepel-triumph-how-to-make-the-best-out-of-sentenza-no-238-of-the-italian-constitutional-court-for-a-
global-legal-order-part-i/; R. Kunz, `The Italian Constitutional Court and ‘Constructive Contestation’ - A 
Miscarried Attempt?´ (2016) 14 JICJ 621; Massimo Lando, ‘Intimations of Unconstitutionality: The Supremacy of 
International Law and Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’ (2015) 78 MLR 1028. 
4 Italian Constitutional Court, Sentenza No. 238/2014, para. 3.3. (English version available at: 
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S238_2013_en.pdf). 
5 ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, 
ICJ Reports 2012, 99. 




on customary international law allows for the State’s explicit consent to become less important. 
Court networks may, in horizontal and vertical dialogs, accelerate the development of customary 
international law rules even against the expressed intention of the executive branch on the basis 
of the principle of judicial independence. 6 Given its role in international relations it is not 
surprising that in particular the executive branch tends to be sceptical of restricting immunities 
even in cases of serious human rights violations. The frictions which have arisen between the 
executive and the judicial branch in Italy are not as specific as it might appear at first sight. 
Actually, in a number of States there is a split between both branches about how to deal with 
immunity exceptions in cases of serious violations of human rights. Comparable developments 
have at least temporarily emerged in Switzerland and the US. The executive branch of another 
State may even try to stop horizontal dialogues between courts of different States by prompting an 
international court’s decision. Likewise, the executive branch – at least in a parliamentary 
democracy – may also hold back legal development through instigating legislation.7  
The adverse impacts which such uncoordinated efforts of prompting or retaining law-reform in a 
decentralised legal order may exert have culminated in the context of the Jurisdictional Immunities 
Case and Sentenza 238 and point to the need for a cautious conduct by all actors involved. Such 
adverse impacts may affect the State itself in so far as non-compliance by courts may incur State 
responsibility. Simultaneously, such symbolic cases of non-compliance risk to undermine the 
authority of international judicial organs, such as the ICJ (B.1. and 2.). Thus, instead of promoting 
the legitimacy of international law a court opposing findings of international judicial organs might 
undermine the international rule of law. Unilateralist attempts to further legal developments 
should be aware of such adverse effects. Otherwise they may themselves contribute to perceived 
legitimacy deficits of the international legal order in that they further double standards, advocate 
standards which are highly contested (B.3.), or create expectations which international law might 
not be able to fulfil (B.4.). Instead, any such effort for law-reform should aim to advocate standards 
which are generalizable outside the specific context of the dispute at hand (C.).  
2. Adverse Effects 
The idea to promote legal development through judicial dialogue is ambivalent. On the one hand, 
the creation of customary international law can be seen as an uncoordinated bottom-up process 
entailing cases of non-compliance as a starting point for new legal rules. On the other hand, where 
constitutional courts contest recent findings of international courts and even choose non-
compliance with a decision against “their” respective State as a means to further a specific 
perception of the adequate legal development they risk to engage their State’s responsibility under 
international law.  
a) Incurring State responsibility 
According to Art. 94 UN-Charta and Art. 59 ICJ Statute Italy has to comply with the findings of the ICJ 
judgment. Art. 94 UN-Charta requires a State to realize the obligations which stem from the 
operative part of the ICJ’s decision, including the ratio decidendi.8 In view of Art. 4 ASR the ICJ 
                                                        
6 Parts of this paper are based on H. Krieger, `Between evolution and stagnations: Immunities in a globalized 
world´ (2014) 6 GoeJIl 177. 
7 H. Krieger (note 6), at 194 et seq. 
8 K. Oellers-Frahm, `Art. 94´ in B. Simma et al (eds.), The United Nations Charter, 3rd ed., Oxford 2012, MN 6/12. 




decision obliges all State organs. Accordingly, the competent State organ has to follow the 
obligation established by the Court’s decision. If it fails to do so, the State engages responsibility.9 
As defined in the commentary to the Articles on State responsibility “the essence of an 
internationally wrongful act lies in the non-conformity of the State’s actual conduct with the 
conduct it ought to have adopted in order to comply with a particular international obligation.”10 
The finding of the Italian Constitutional Court that Article 3 of Law No. 5/2013 which aims to 
implement the ICJ’s decision “has to be declared unconstitutional” 11 constitutes such a non-
conformity. However, the findings of the Constitutional Court may only establish conduct prior to a 
breach so that the breach is just “apprehended or imminent”12 but has not yet occurred.13 The 
commentary to the ASR does not formulate any general rule in this regard but highlights that the 
decision needs to take into account the concrete primary obligation, the facts of the case and the 
context. It suggests that “preparatory conduct does not itself amount to a breach if it does not 
‘predetermine the final decision to be taken’.”14  
Thus, the question whether the judgment of the Constitutional Court violates Italy’s obligations 
under the ICJ judgment as based on Art. 94 UN-Charta depends on the effects that the decision 
entails within the Italian legal order for other Italian state organs in their international relations 
with Germany as well as on their actual behaviour. According to Art. 136 of the Italian Constitution a 
law which the Constitutional Court has declared unconstitutional does no longer have any effect 
from the day following the publication of the decision. As Karin Oellers-Frahm has demonstrated, 
because of Sentenza 238 the law enacting the UN Charter albeit only in relation to Art. 94 UN 
Charter and also only in relation to Sentenza 238 as well as the law implementing the ICJ judgment 
do no longer pertain to the Italian legal order. Neither is the customary international law rule on 
State immunity insofar as it contradicts fundamental constitutional principles.15 However, as long 
as the decision gives a certain leeway that allows other courts, the executive and the legislative 
branch to comply with the judgment in a manner still compatible with international law a breach 
would not have yet occurred.16 After all the ICJ in its 2012 ruling gave Italy a certain discretion in 
implementing the judgment when it found that “the Italian Republic must, by enacting appropriate 
legislation, or by resorting to other methods of its choosing, ensure that the decisions of its courts 
and those of other judicial authorities infringing the immunity which the Federal Republic of 
Germany enjoys under international law cease to have effect.”17  Thus, it is important to note that 
                                                        
9 K. Oellers-Frahm (note 8), MN 12. 
10 J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries, Cambridge 2002), Commentary to art. 12, para. 3, at 126. 
11 Italian Constitutional Court, Sentenza No. 238/2014 (note 4), para. 5. 
12 J. Crawford (note 10), Commentary to art. 14 para. 13, at 138 et seq. 
13 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, 7, 
at 51 para. 79: “Such a situation is not unusual in international law or, for that matter, in domestic law. A 
wrongful act or offence is frequently preceded by preparatory actions which are not to be confused with the 
act or offence itself. It is as well to distinguish between the actual commission of a wrongful act (whether 
instantaneous or continuous) and the conduct prior to that act which is of a preparatory character and which 
‘does not qualify as a wrongful act’ ...” 
14 J. Crawford (note 10), Commentary to art. 14, para. 13, at 138 et seq. 
15 K. Oellers-Frahm, `A never-ending story: The International Court of Justice – The Italian Constitutional Court 
– Italian Tribunals and the Question of Immunity´(2016) ZaöRV 193, at 196. 
16 Cf. J. Crawford (note 11), Commentary to art. 12, para. 12 at 130; C. Tomuschat, `National and international law 
in Italy: The end of an idyll` (2014) 6 IJPL 187, at 192 et seq. 
17 ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, 
ICJ Reports 2012, 99, at 155 para. 139. 




the Italian executive branch argued in the ensuing cases before Italian civil courts that the courts 
should grant Germany jurisdictional immunity.18 Of course, in the concrete case at hand these 
reflections are already theoretical because Italian court’s have issued default judgments and 
decision on the merits in the wake of Sentenza 238.19 These court proceedings do not only again 
infringe the rules on State immunity but they also constitute a breach of Italy’s legal obligation 
flowing from the findings of the ICJ in its 2012 judgment.  
In literature there are a number of voices which suggest that wrongfulness of such a conduct 
should be precluded. A particularly far-reaching approach suggests that wrongfulness could be 
precluded by invoking that a democratic State must respect the fundamental rights guaranteed in 
its Constitution.20 However, such approaches are not only irreconcilable with Art. 27 VCLT as well as 
Artts. 4 and 32 ASR. They would also have adverse long-term effects for the international legal 
order. Such a justification would undermine the sovereign equality of States and induce a hierarchy 
between States necessarily distinguishing between democratic States and other States. The 
question would arise whether even an international tribunal would be well advised to make any 
determination on the basis of such value and policy loaded criteria. Would the German as well as 
the Italian Constitutional Court be justified to refuse compliance with judgments of the ECHR on 
the basis of their reasoning in the Görgülü Case21 or in Sentenza 238 because they are genuine 
constitutional democracies while the Russian Constitutional Court would not be justified to do so 
in the Yukos Case22?  
b) Preserving judicial authority through legitimizing strategies? 
Acting against traditional standards of the rule of law courts which choose non-compliance cross 
the limits of judicial dialogue and thus challenge the authority of international judicial organs. 
Therefore, they will have to rely on additional considerations of legitimacy in order to make their 
case acceptable for their national audiences as well as the international community. While the 
Italian Constitutional Court seems to have been aware of such dilemmas it has not succeeded in 
mitigating them through its legitimizing strategy. 
In its self-perception, Sentenza 238 pressures for a progressive evolution of international law and 
aims to gain legitimacy by referring to two precedents: the role of national courts in the early 20th 
                                                        
18 K. Oellers-Frahm (note 15), at 195 et seq.  
19 K. Oellers-Frahm (note 15), at 193 et seqq.; see, in particular, for decisions on the merits: Tribunale di Firenze, 
Order of 23 March 2015 and Decision No. 2468/2015 of 6 July 2015; Tribunale di Piacenza, Sentenza No. 723/2015 
of 25 September 2015; for an English analysis of these three decisions see K. Oellers-Frahm (note 15) at 197 et 
seqq. 
20 For this approach albeit critically: M. Iovane, `The Italian Constitutional Court Judgment No. 238 and the Myth 
of the ‘Constitutionalization’of International Law´(2016) 14 JICJ 595, at 604 with reference to B. Conforti, Diritto 
Internazionale, 10th ed., Napels 2014, at 402 et seq. 
21 German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 111, 307 (2004) - Görgülü. 
22 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Judgment of 19 January 2017 № 1-П regarding the 
constitutionality of execution of the European Court of Human Rights judgment of 31 July 2014 in the 
case “OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya "YUKOS" vs Russia” and ECHR, OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia, 
Appl. No. 14902/04, Judgments of 20 September 2011 and 31 July 2014; for an analysis of the Russian 
Constitutional Court’s approach see: M. Hartwig, `Vom Dialog zum Disput? Verfassungsrecht vs. Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention -- Der Fall der Russländischen Föderation`(2017) 44 EuGRZ, 1-22. 




century which enabled law-reform by establishing the distinction between acta iure imperii and 
acta iure gestionis23 and the Kadi decision24 of the European Court of Justice.25 
Sentenza 238 stresses the historically important role Italian courts played in the process of 
establishing the differentiation between acta gestiones and acta iure imperii. 26 However, the 
historical comparison cannot sufficiently legitimize the Constitutional Court’s approach since 
context conditions are different in both cases. In the early 20th century the international legal order 
was even more decentralized than it is today. Italian and Belgian courts did not act in non-
compliance with a judgment of the central judicial organ of the international community in the 
immediate wake of the pronouncement of that decision. They did not set a precedent for other 
courts to question the authority of such an institution. As Anne Peters and Raffaela Kunz have 
underlined, this factor also constitutes a significant difference to the Kadi decision of the European 
Court of Justice. While both courts might aim to protect “constitutional principles” against 
conflicting international obligations the Kadi decision is directed against a political organ whose 
nearly unfettered discretion is hardly controlled by international courts.27 In this respect, the ECJ 
can raise a much stronger claim to realize the idea of a dédoublement fonctionelle, to act as an 
organ of international law, than the Italian Constitutional Court.  
Judges who try to push for law-reform by initiating non-compliance with decisions of international 
courts should be aware that the overall international climate is currently changing. With the 
lingering shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world order the liberal perception of international 
law has come under attack. Across the board international norms and institutions are contested 
and perceptions of international law’s legitimacy vary according to the again increasingly diverging 
national (ideological) backgrounds.28 Today national courts act in the company of and thereby 
                                                        
23 Italian Constitutional Court, Sentenza No. 238/2014 (note 4), para. 3.3.  
24 ECJ, Judgment of the Court of 3 September 2008 - Kadi and Al Barakaat - joint cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 
P, ECR 2008, I-6351. 
25 Italian Constitutional Court, Sentenza No. 238/2014 (note 4), para. 3.4. 
26 Italian Constitutional Court, Sentenza No. 238/2014 (note 4), para. 3.3.: “The customary international norm of 
immunity of States from the civil jurisdiction of other States was originally absolute, since it included all state 
behaviors. More recently, namely in the first half of the last century, this norm undertook a progressive 
evolution by virtue of national jurisprudence, in the majority of States, up until the identification of acta jure 
gestionis (an easily understandable expression) as the relevant limit. And it is well known that this limit to the 
application of the norm of immunity was progressively established mainly thanks to Italian judges (…) – the 
so- called „Italian-Belgian theory ‟. In short, national judges limited the scope of the customary international 
norm, as immunity from civil jurisdiction of other States was granted only for acts considered jure imperii. … It 
is of significant importance that the evolution as described above originated in the national jurisprudence, as 
national courts normally have the power to determine their competence, and leave to international organs 
the recognition of the practice for the purposes of identifying customary law and its evolution.  
Since such a reduction of immunity for the purposes of protection of rights took place, as far as the Italian 
legal order is concerned, thanks to the control exercised by ordinary judges in an institutional system 
characterized by a flexible Constitution (in which the recognition of rights was supported by limited 
guarantees only), the exercise of the same control in the republican constitutional order (founded on the 
protection of rights and the consequent limitation of powers, as guaranteed by a rigid Constitution) falls 
inevitably to this Court.“ 
27 A. Peters (note 3); R. Kunz (note 3), at 626; see also M. Scheinin, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court’s Judgment 
238 of 2014 Is Not Another Kadi Case’ (2016) 14 JICJ 615; C. Tomuschat (note 17), at 189. 
28 H. Krieger & G. Nolte, `The International Rule of Law – Rise or Decline? – Points of Departure´, KFG Working 
Paper Series, No. 1, Berlin Potsdam Research Group “The International Rule of Law – Rise or Decline?”, Berlin 
October 2016; see also K. Alter, ‘The Future of International Law’ in D. Ayton-Shenker (ed.), The New Global 
Agenda, Lahnham 2018, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015177; D. Bosco, ‘We have been here before’ 
(2017) 70 Columbia JIA 9; A.-M. Slaughter, ‘The return of anarchy?’ (2017) 70 JIA. 




support the Russian Constitutional Court which refuses compliance with the judgments of the 
ECHR. Even if Sentenza 238 does not claim to argue at the level of international law the Italian 
Constitutional Court is well aware that declaring the legislation implementing the ICJ decision as 
unconstitutional challenges the authority of the UN’s principal judicial organ. After all, the Court 
explicitly expresses the hope to contribute to law-reform. In the past, “reasonable resistance by 
national actors – if it is exercised … in good faith and with due regard for the overarching ideal of 
international cooperation – might [have built]… up the political pressure needed for promoting the 
progressive evolution of international law in the direction of a system more considerate of human 
rights.”29 As Anne Peters has stressed decisions, such as the Solange I decision30 of the German 
Constitutional Court or the ECJ’s Kadi decision have contributed to a progressive development of 
international law and international institutions. However, today considerable changes in the 
overall atmosphere of the international order affect what should be considered as good faith. 
Challenge arising from non-compliance with decisions of the ICJ can be detrimental to the 
normativity of the international legal order in its current shape. They endanger universality and 
multilateralism as its most important foundations in favour of particularity and unilateralism. In 
the long run recurring precedents of national “civil disobedience” might be as dangerous for the 
normative force of international human rights law as they are at present detrimental for general 
international law. The symbolism and the precedential effects of such forms of disobedience can 
probably not be contained to what the Italian Constitutional Court conceives to be legitimate but 
extends to scenarios, such as the Yukos Case. Law-reform beyond formal avenues needs to make 
sure that its postulations are generalizable and needs to take the risk of misuse serious. In the 
case of Sentenza 238/2014 the risk of abuse does not only arise from the precendential effects of 
non-compliance but also from the implications for the rule on immunities itself. 
c) Change “desired by many?” – Highly contested exceptions to immunities  
Sentenza 238 hopes to „contribute to a desirable – and desired by many – evolution of 
international law itself”31 by furthering human rights based exceptions to State immunities. It starts 
from the assumption that the values which it wants to promote and which are based on its reading 
of the Italian Constitution are shared globally. Such an understanding would be a necessary 
starting point for any bona fide act of non-compliance with an ICJ decision. However, in the case of 
human rights based exceptions to immunities a consensus about the desirability of change is far 
from clear. The ICJ has based its 2012 findings on a thorough analysis of relevant national court 
decisions and other State practice.32 In the aftermath of the decision other courts have applied the 
ICJ judgment.33 The structurally comparable human rights based exceptions to the immunities of 
State officials have proved to be highly contested in the UN 6th Committee.34  
                                                        
29 A. Peters (note 3). 
30 German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) – Solange I. 
31 Italian Constitutional Court, Sentenza No. 238/2014 (note 4), para. 3.3. 
32 ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of 3 February 
2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99, at 127, paras. 65 et seqq. 
33 E.g.: Canada: Supreme Court of Canada, Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 
176, paras. 61, 103-108. 
34 The 2017 debate on draft article 7 para (1) containing human rights based exceptions to State Official 
immunities can be summarized as follows: 23 States have argued in favour of the general rule included in the 
article while 21 States disagreed with it. A number of States promoting the rule have expressed their 
conviction that it constitutes a progressive development of international law. 




Even within Italy the findings of the Court are not undisputed. The Italian executive branch seems 
to be well aware that changes in international law for which the Constitutional Court advocates are 
likely to entail adverse consequences also for Italy itself. 35 As, for instance, the U.S. State 
Department has affirmed in the past regarding the claim for a ius cogens based immunity 
exception for State officials in proceedings before national courts: “[t]he recognition of such an 
exception could prompt reciprocal limitations by foreign jurisdictions exposing U.S. state officials 
to suit abroad on that basis.”36 The U.S. worries that by altering their own judicial practice, it will 
contribute to the creation of a new customary international law rule that would lead to their State 
officials being subject to similar proceedings all over the world. In particular, in the case of the 
U.S., there is a not entirely unfounded apprehension that these proceedings may not always be 
conducted in an impartial manner.37 
Is this assumption farfetched? If proceedings are carried out against foreign States and their State 
officials in cases of grave violations of human rights before national courts in the U.S., Switzerland, 
Canada, Italy and the UK, these States will also have to accept such proceedings against 
themselves and their State officials before national courts in Algeria, China, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, 
Iran, Congo, Rwanda or Zimbabwe.38 In the end, the denial of immunity requires an international 
community of constitutional States. As long as this requirement is not met democratic 
constitutional States should perceive the perspective of legal proceedings in the forum State at 
least as ambivalent from a fundamental rights standpoint of their own nationals and with a view to 
their own standing. As long as there is no such international community of constitutional States, 
immunity also serves democratic constitutional States to protect themselves and their State 
officials from being exposed to court proceedings which do not meet the standard of the rule of 
law.39 Hence, the United States District Court clearly stated in the case Tabion v. Mufti that the aim 
of granting immunity was “[to] protect United States [officials] from [...] prosecution in foreign 
lands [...] [because] not all countries provide the level of due process to which United States 
citizens have become accustomed [...]”.40 In light of such conflicts between normative claims and 
legal reality, immunity seems to be, in the words of Hazel Fox, “[...] a neutral way of denying 
jurisdiction to States over the internal administration of another State and diverting claims to 
settlement in the courts of that State, or by diplomatic or other international means to which that 
State has consented.”41 
If immunity serves as a plea against the exercise of jurisdiction in a decentralized legal system 
where competences are divided and is in the words of Fox and Webb “a signal to the forum court 
                                                        
35 K. Oellers-Frahm (note 15), at 195 et seq. 
36 US Court of Appeals, Matar and Others v. Dichter, Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Affirmance, (2007) 2nd Cir. Docket No. 07-2579-cv, available at 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Matar%20v%20%20Dichter,%20US%20for%20Defendants%20Amicus%20Brief%2012.
19.07.pdf (last visited 16 February 2018), 4; see also J. B. Bellinger, ‘The Dog that Caught the Car: Observations 
on the Past, Present, and Future Approaches of the Office of the Legal Adviser to Official Acts Immunities’ 
(2011) 44 VJTL 819, 834. 
37 H. Krieger (note 6), at 193 et seq. 
38 H. Krieger (note 6), at 213 et seq. 
39 H. Krieger (note 6), at 214. 
40 U.S. Distirct Court, Tabion v. Mufti, (E.D. Va. 1995) 877 F. Supp. 285, 293. 
41 H. Fox, ‘In Defence of State Immunity, Why the UN Convention on State Immunity is Important’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 
399, at 405.  




that jurisdiction belongs to another court or method of adjudication”42 the question arises whether 
any consequences need to be attached to the fact that claims for reparation by Italian citizens are 
rejected by German courts. After all, a justification for granting immunity can be seen in the fact 
that generally immunities do not lead to the loss of a claim or that an offender remains criminally 
responsible. As a rule, there are alternative legal paths or international mechanism available that 
correspond to each kind of immunity.43  
Thus, the Constitutional Court in Sentenza 238 has been interpreted as mandating “that the 
customary rule of foreign state immunity is not incorporated into the Italian legal system, insofar 
as that rule applies to international crimes for which there is no effective means of redress 
available to the victims other than a suit in the forum state.”44 However, the right to access to 
court, at least under the European Convention on Human Rights, is not per se infringed if a case is 
decided on the merits. Cases brought before German courts were considered to be unfounded 
because either the specific regime of State responsibility under German law was not applicable to 
military activities in armed conflict or because there is no individual right to compensation for 
violations of international humanitarian law.45 While this approach may appear to be unjust, it 
conforms to the prevailing view in international humanitarian law and corresponds mutatis 
mutandis to approaches in other States under the rule of law.46 It can therefore not be considered 
as an arbitrary jurisprudence. 
d) Creating false promises - Human rights exceptions to immunities from execution? 
Has the situation of Italian claimants now at least been improved by Sentenza 238 and the ensuing 
decisions of Italian civil courts? To reach this aim yet another step in law-reform would be required 
by extending human rights exceptions to immunities from execution. In Sentenza 238 the 
Constitutional Court did explicitly not deal with immunity from measures of constraint.47 Thus, 
under Italian Constitutional Law it is not yet clear whether immunities from execution are 
compatible with the right to access to court where serious violations of human rights are at stake. 
Accordingly, in the situation at hand policy reasons push for further human rights exceptions to 
immunities from execution: 
Court decisions rendered in the wake of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence create an expectation 
on the side of the applicants that they will indeed receive a monetary compensation. In Italy, most 
German State assets are protected by immunities because they serve government non-commercial 
purpose, while enforcement in Germany will be unsuccessful because judgments, which are based 
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on a violation of German jurisdictional immunities, suffer from a serious procedural defect so that 
they cannot serve as a basis for measures of constraint.48 Therefore, it is not farfetched to assume 
that the case at hand will put additional pressure on the distinction between (pre-judgment) 
immunity from jurisdiction and (post-judgment) immunity from execution. It is not unconceivable 
that if immunity from jurisdiction was to be considered unconstitutional because of an 
infringement of the right to access to court, immunity from execution will likewise be affected.49  
Such additional pressure is also buttressed by a broad expectation of consistency as an element of 
the rule of law concept. Expectations of consistency create an extra argumentative burden for 
justifying that human rights exceptions should not apply to immunities from execution. A lack of 
consistency is the major policy argument in favour of any kind of additional restriction of 
enforcement immunity because “a denial of justice on the enforcement level would render the 
adjudicatory jurisdiction, granted under any restrictive immunity concept meaningless.” 50  
Accordingly, based on its jurisprudence that human rights should be effective and not illusory the 
European Court of Human Rights held that the right of access to Court according to Art. 6 ECHR 
does not only concern the pre-judgment phase but also the post-judgment phase of execution. The 
right based on Art. 6 ECHR would “... be illusory if a Contracting State’s domestic legal system 
allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party.”51 
Accordingly, a consequentialist argument has been raised by two Judges of the European Court of 
Human Rights in a concurring opinion in the Al-Adsani Case according to which restrictions on 
immunity for violations of the right to access to court „would thus have required a possibility of 
having judgments – probably often default judgments – … executed against respondent States. This 
in turn would raise the question whether the traditionally strong immunity of public property from 
execution would also have had to be regarded as incompatible with Article 6.“52 
However, the judges who were raising this argument actually used it as a counterargument against 
restricting pre-judgment immunity. They warned against the unintended consequences that result 
from expectations of consistency which blur more complex reasons for differentiation. Thus, the 
confirmation of the ICJ in the Jurisdictional Immunites case that immunity from suit and immunity 
from execution are distinct53 is still widely shared.54 Under customary international law States 
enjoy immunity from execution in relation to property which is used for government non-
commercial purposes (see also Art. 19 of the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
their Property). Since immunity from execution is applied separately from immunity from 
jurisdiction reasons excluding to invoke immunity from jurisdiction are not directly applicable to 
immunity from execution.55 
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Such a differentiation is justified because measures of constraint against property used for 
government non-commercial purposes intrude even further into sovereign rights than the 
institution of proceedings before courts in the forum State.56 It is particularly difficult for States to 
protect assets and other property situated in a foreign State. These assets may therefore be 
susceptible to abusive enforcement measures while at the same time they form an essential basis 
for the actual conduct of international relations. The rationale of strong protection for property 
designed for government non-commercial purposes has clearly been expressed in the presidential 
waiver issued by President Clinton in relation to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act which allows 
United States victims of terrorism to attach and execute judgments against a foreign State’s 
diplomatic or consular properties:57  
“If this section [of the Act] were to result in attachment and execution against foreign embassy 
properties, it would encroach on my authority under the Constitution to ‘receive Ambassadors and 
other public Ministers’. Moreover, if applied to foreign diplomatic or consular property, section 177 
would place the United States in breach of its international treaty obligations. It would put at risk 
the protection we enjoy at every embassy and consulate throughout the world by eroding the 
principle that diplomatic property must be protected regardless of bilateral relations .... In 
addition, section 177 could seriously affect our ability to enter into global claims settlements that 
are fair to all United States claimants and could result in United States taxpayer liability in the 
event of a contrary claims tribunal judgment.”58 
3. Generalizable standards - Towards an obligation to provide for individual reparation in 
cases of mass atrocities? 
The presidential waiver emphasizes the need to negotiate global claims settlements as an 
alternative form of compensation to individual reparation granted by national courts in the U.S. 
thus stressing the need for political leeway in such cases. Are there good reasons for retaining such 
a leeway? Or should there be an obligation incumbent upon States to provide for individual 
monetary compensation in cases of mass atrocities as a matter of a general rule of international 
law?  
While international law still does not provide for a general right to compensation in cases of 
violations of international humanitarian law, there are increasing efforts on the international as 
well as on the national level to change the existing law. Such a call for an obligation to grant 
individual monetary compensation is owed to changing perceptions in public opinion on the 
position of the individual in armed conflicts and the concerted NGO efforts to bring pertinent cases 
before national courts.59 Indications for a change in the overall perception might, inter alia, be 
seen in the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
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Humanitarian Law”60 although these principles would still not create a subjective right under 
international law on which an individual could rely before a domestic court.61 
Even the German Constitutional Court seems to have left the door open for future judicial review of 
activities of the German armed forces abroad in the 2013 Varvarin decision. Although it did not 
have to decide the question whether the ordinary law of State liability covers damages caused by 
war,62 it made clear that courts are competent and capable to judicially control the decision to 
qualify an object as a military object according to international humanitarian law.63 It thus stressed 
its competence to deal with violations of international humanitarian law as a matter of human 
rights adjudication. Thus, while the German Federal Court of Justice in its 2016 judgment clinged to 
the traditional interpretation that neither the specific regime of State responsibility under German 
law is applicable to military activities in armed conflict nor that there is an individual right to 
compensation for violations of international humanitarian law,64 the Constitutional Court might 
take a different  stance.  
But it is not only the increasing focus on the individual in international law and international 
relations which fosters such a change in the conceptualization of how to treat individuals during 
and in the aftermath of an armed conflict. The perception that the individual should be 
compensated as a matter of law is also owed to the predominant nature of armed conflicts during 
the last 20 years. Military interventions by NATO States or under the umbrella of the United Nations 
were often not understood as being conducted against a whole State and its population but 
against non-state actors or “rogue” governments. Accordingly, the post-conflict order needed to 
distinguish more clearly between different groups and individuals within a State.65 This supported 
the idea that the affected population should be redressed for any harm incurred during the armed 
conflict or at least during the phase of post-conflict reconstruction. However, the issue of 
individual reparations in cases of mass atrocities should be treated cautiously. Military 
interventions with an aim to stabilize a State and even to protect human rights might in the nearer 
future fade into the background while more traditional forms of armed conflict might re-emerge, 
such as in Ukraine and Syria.  
In this context it is important to note that in the current debates in the ILC on crimes against 
humanity a general rule that in cases of mass atrocities an individual right to reparation exists or 
should exist under international law is apparently treated cautiously. The Special Rapporteur 
emphasises in his third report of 2017 that “there appears to be recognition … that establishing an 
individual right to reparation for each victim may be problematic in the context of a mass 
atrocity.66 …While reparation specific to each of the victims may be warranted, such as through the 
use of regular civil claims processes in national courts or through a specially designed process of 
mass claims compensation, in some situations only collective forms of reparation may be feasible 
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or preferable, such as the building of monuments of remembrance or the reconstruction of 
schools, hospitals, clinics and places of worship.”67  
This more cautious approach takes into account the complexities of ending armed conflicts and 
negotiating peace deals. An individual right to monetary compensation based on civil claim 
processes in cases of mass atrocities does not allow for taking into account broader political 
considerations related to establishing a stable post-war order. Such a right is conducive to 
bilateral settlements between the State parties concerned which might create new injustice 
towards other groups of victims. It might also overburden negotiations for a settlement of an on-
going armed conflict. Take the Syrian example: Already the individual criminal responsibility of 
Assad contributes to obstructing peace talks. Likewise, ex post claims for monetary compensation 
before civil courts in the aftermath of a comprehensive peace agreement entail the concrete risk 
that parties to a conflict will be even more reluctant to reach agreement if they cannot rely on the 
stability of such an agreement. 68  Armed conflicts and conditions for ending them differ 
considerably. The specificities of these situations speak against any generalization with a view of 
changing existing international law. Those responsible for concluding peace agreements which 
allow for reconciliation should have a broad political discretion in reaching this aim. While 
individual claims for monetary compensation might be part of such a process, such as in 
Colombia,69 it seems wise to me to give room for the possibility that only collective and symbolic 
forms of reparation will be foreseen.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
Thus, instead of furthering the law’s legitimacy decisions, such as Sentenza 238/2014 may erode 
international law’s legitimacy. To point out to such adverse consequences is not sustained by a 
“realistic” view that fosters State sovereignty for the protection of national interests. To my mind, 
we should not loose out of sight that the stability of the international legal order itself as 
guaranteed by concepts such as immunities and that the respect for its juridical organs serves to 
protect human rights albeit in an indirect manner. It might thus be wiser to accept that not every 
injustice can be addressed by law, that law cannot always provide a satisfying solution but that 
such a solution should sometimes better be looked for and confined to the political stage. In line 
with the passage of the ICJ judgment70 a solution sustainable for both side could be seen in 
negotiations at the political stage. 
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Part II: Would the world be a better place if one were to adopt a ‘European’ approach to State 
immunity? or: ‚Soll am europäischen Wesen die Staatenimmunität genesen?‘ 




This contribution addresses a somewhat colorful bundle of questions. All of those questions, 
however, one way or the other, relate to the overarching theme as to whether there exist de lege 
lata, or whether there at least ought to exist de lege ferenda, specific European perspectives when 
it comes to the law of State immunity in situations where serious violations of international law 
have been committed, or where, more realistically in current circumstances, such violations are 
being alleged by the claimant. To come straight to the point, the blunt answer to this question is, in 
the author’s opinion, a twofold clear and simple ‘no’: there is no European Sonderweg, or ‘special 
way’, when it comes to the law of State immunity, and there ought not to be such a European 
Sonderweg either.  
Rather, member States of the European Union, as well as the contracting parties of the European 
Convention on Human Rights more broadly, should continue to abide by universally recognized 
principles of State immunity, as having been confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its 
2012 judgment on the matter. 72  Accordingly, relevant treaty norms, including the European 
Convention on Human Rights,73 as well as applicable secondary legislation of the European Union,74 
should (continue to) be interpreted and applied in line with currently applicable norms of 
customary and treaty law on the matter. 
Having thus set the scene for the approach adopted in this contribution, the following sections will 
delve into more specific issues surrounding the topic. First, a somewhat technical aspect will be 
addressed, namely the enforcement, in individual European States, of domestic judgments 
rendered contrary to traditional concepts of State immunity (2.). In particular, the debate within 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law in the late 1990s will be summarized since it 
was also of relevance for both the debate on the 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional 
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Immunities of States75 and the development of the Brussels regulation. Second, the possible 
development of specific rules of regional customary law on the matter will be discussed (3.). Third, 
the legal implications of the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court for European military 
operations, in particular for military operations under the auspices of the European Union, will be 
analyzed (4.). The contribution will conclude with some remarks as to possible “European 
perspectives” beyond Sentenza 238 (5.). 
2. Enforcing foreign judgments not having respected State immunity 
a) Hague Conference on private international law  
It was in 1996 that the Hague Conference on Private International Law, with an important input 
from European States, as well as from the European Union, had decided to “include in the agenda 
of the 19th Session the question of (…) recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil 
and commercial matters”.76 This led to the creation of a Special Commission to come up with a first 
draft of such a convention. The Special Commission’s 1999 draft had included a draft Art. 18 para. 3 
which, if adopted, would have provided, as one option, for the possibility of exercising universal 
jurisdiction in civil matters in respect of conduct which constitutes genocide, a crime against 
humanity or a war crime, another form of a serious crime against a natural person under 
international law, respectively a jus cogens violation.77 It is worth recalling that the draft provision 
had also provided that, at least as far as the two latter categories of violations of international law 
are concerned (i.e. serious crimes under international law and jus cogens violations other than 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity) the envisaged broad acceptance of jurisdiction 
would only apply “(…) if the party seeking relief is exposed to a risk of a denial of justice because 
proceedings in another State are not possible or cannot reasonably be required”.78 
This draft provision thus foreshadowed the last resort-argument later made by Italy during the ICJ 
proceedings brought by Germany for alleged violations of Germany’s State immunity.79 It ought to 
be noted, however, that, as the underlying Nygh/Pocar explanatory report had then made clear,80 
this provision was only meant to govern jurisdictional issues, while State immunity was not meant 
to be limited by the envisaged treaty. This was confirmed by its draft Art. 1 para. 4, which in broad 
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terms had provided that “(…) [n]othing in this Convention affects the privileges and immunities of 
sovereign States or of entities of sovereign States, or of international organizations”.81 
It ought to be also noted that the International Law Commission was, during the very same period, 
also working on a draft convention on jurisdictional immunities of States82, which, as is well-known, 
later lead to the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the matter.83 The ILC’s draft 
convention did neither include any reference to a possible limitation on State immunity in case of 
serious violations of international law.84 
Notwithstanding this development within the ILC, the further 2001 draft Hague convention, as 
submitted to and discussed by the Hague diplomatic conference, had retained, mutatis mutandis, 
identical language to the same effect as the 1999 draft by the then Special Commission. Put 
otherwise, it had retained the concept of State immunity even when it comes to instances of 
genocide, war crimes, as well as other violations of jus cogens. 
What is brought out by this development is that even the possible acceptance of the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction in matters such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, in the 
envisaged future convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, would not 
have been meant to curtail traditional concepts of State immunity, even when it comes to serious 
violations of international law. What is more, however, as is evident from the fate of the draft, is 
that even on those issues no consensus could be reached, which lead, in 2005, to the adoption of a 
mere convention on choice of court agreements.85 
b) Brussels Ia Regulation 
Turning now to developments within the framework of the European Union more specifically, as is 
well known, the Brussels regulation was amended in 2015. Commonly referred to as the Brussels Ia 
Regulation, it built on the Brussels and Lugano conventions86, as well as earlier versions of the 
Brussels regulation itself.87 It significantly facilitates the enforcement of judgments on civil and 
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commercial matters rendered in another member State of the European Union by providing for a 
quasi-automatic system of enforcement of such judgments.88 
This raises the question whether under the Brussels regulation a judgment by a domestic court of 
one member State of the European Union, denying State immunity when it comes to alleged 
violations of jus cogens committed by armed forces of another State, is enforceable in other 
member States of the European Union. If that were the case, this would clearly be indicative of an 
acceptance, by the European Union, of a special regime of a more limited State immunity. 
Before entering into details, it should be noted that preambular paragraph 38 of the said 
regulation confirms that in view of its drafters it “respects fundamental rights and observes the 
principles recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular the 
right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter.” After having 
thus confirmed that the regulation stands in line with the right to an effective remedy, the 
regulation, as amended in 2015, now expressis verbis settles that it “shall not extend, in particular, 
to (…) the liability of the State for acts and omissions in the exercise of State authority (acta iure 
imperii)”89. 
The amended version, therefore, now also expressis verbis reiterates what the European Court of 
Justice had already decided in 2007 under the then applicable older version of the Brussels 
regulation in the Kalavryta case brought by Ms Lechouritou versus Germany involving a claim for 
damages related to a massacre committed by the German army in 1943 against Greek civilians.90 
The European Court of Justice had then decided that such claims do not amount to civil and 
commercial claims within the meaning of the Brussels system providing for the intra-Union 
enforcement of judgments.  
What is, however, brought out by the interplay between the preamble of the amended regulation 
and the exclusion from its scope of acta jure imperii, such as acts of armed forces, in particular 
when they take place within the framework of armed conflicts,91 is that the Brussels regulation, as 
amended, wanted to ‘safeguard’ traditional rules of State immunity. 
What is more is that the drafters of the amended regulation were obviously aware of the then 
recent judgment of the ICJ in the Germany versus Italy jurisdictional immunities case. They were 
also aware of the prior unsuccessful attempts to use the Brussels regulation to enforce Greek court 
decisions in Italy,92 which had set aside Germany’s State immunity in cases involving war crimes, 
but which could not be enforced in Greece itself for lack of consent by the Greek Minister of 
Justice.93 Accordingly, the amendment of the Brussels regulation in 2015, when read in conjunction 
with the above-mentioned preamble to the regulation, must be seen as evidence of the conviction 
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of the member States of the European Union that the traditional rules of State immunity, including 
when it comes to violations of jus cogens, are indeed compatible with the international and 
European rule of law.  
3. Regional European customary law on State immunity?  
Obviously, international law, ever since the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the 
Asylum case, recognizes, be it only as a matter of principle, the concept, notion and possibility of 
regional customary law.94 Yet, as the Court then stated, the existence of any such rule presupposes 
that “(…) [t]he Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove (…) that the rule invoked by it 
is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question”, which 
statement, the Court confirmed,  “(…) follow[ed] from Article 38 of the Statute of the Court, which 
refers to international custom ‘as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’.”95 
Accordingly, in the case at hand, in order to argue in favor of a rule of regional customary law 
limiting State immunity when it comes to jus cogens violations, one would have to show coherent 
and consistent State practice, by European States, confirming the existence of such a rule (or the 
emergence thereof). Yet, even if one were to limit oneself to the practice of the member States of 
the European Union (which in itself would be problematic), there are only singular cases where no 
State immunity has been granted even where the underlying issues related to serious violations of 
either international humanitarian law or human rights law. As a matter of fact, even in the case of 
Italy, the Italian government continues to take the position that Germany at least enjoys immunity 
when it comes to the execution of the underlying judgments,96 while the judgment of the Italian 
Constitutional Court97 did not base its decision on international law, but rather exclusively on 
domestic Italian law.98 
What is more is that the 2012 judgment of the ICJ, in turn, had made frequent reference specifically 
to decisions of European Courts, including judgments by Polish, 99 Slovenian, 100 Belgian 101 and 
Serbian courts,102 and on that basis had upheld Germany’s State immunity even in the face of 
serious violations of the laws and customs of war.103 Hence, at most, there is practice by two 
European States only, namely Italy itself, and possibly Greece (even if the Greek government did 
not grant the necessary permission to enforce a judgment of Greek courts against Germany, which 
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then led to an attempt to have the said judgment be enforced in Italy) denying State immunity in 
cases of jus cogens violations. Even in those instances, this practice is, however, limited to the 
practice of national courts, rather than that of either the executive or the legislative branch, which 
in and of itself raises fundamental questions as to the notion and concept of State practice within 
the meaning of Art. 38 ICJ Statute.104 
Furthermore, four European States, namely Finland, Sweden, Norway, but also Italy itself, have 
made it clear, when ratifying the 2004 United Nations Convention on State Immunity, that in their 
respective understanding the foreign tort exception to State immunity under the Convention does 
not apply when it comes to activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, and indeed even 
beyond as far as any form of “activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of 
their official duties” are concerned.105 Besides, one might also recall the well-known Art. 31 of the 
European Convention on the matter106 which even expressis verbis contains the very same idea.107 
Finally, the regional European human rights institution, i.e. the European Court of Human Rights, 
has also, time and again, upheld a broad concept of State immunity. As a matter of fact, it did so 
even in the face of jus cogens violations such as torture.108 
Put otherwise, one might even be tempted to say that if there is one region in the World where the 
traditional concept of State immunity has been upheld the most, it is Europe. Even if one were to, 
however, take a different position, be it only arguendo, namely that there indeed was a European 
tendency to restrict State immunity when it comes to violations of international humanitarian law 
or human rights law, the necessary requirements for the creation of a new, more limited rule of 
customary international law on the matter within a short period of time within the parameters of 
the ICJ’s North Sea Continental Shelf case109 are clearly not fulfilled. Indeed, they are not fulfilled 
not only for lack of a virtually uniform practice, but also for lack of participation in such practice of 
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those States most concerned by the matter, which in the case at hand, certainly not the least, 
would also have to include Germany. 
Given this situation, it seems to be hardly imaginable that in the foreseeable future a specific 
“European” customary law norm on State immunity could develop. Rather, it seems that the 
European Union and its member States, as well as other member States of the Council of Europe, 
such as Norway, Turkey or the Russian Federation, continue to rely on a broad concept of State 
immunity. This is also brought out, inter alia, by the recent demarches of the European Union 
against the so-called United States ‘Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act’ (JASTA)110, that, by 
way of amending the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, significantly narrows the scope of 
foreign sovereign immunity under domestic US law – and it does so in violation of international 
law.111 
As a matter of fact, out of the 14 European States having so far ratified the 2004 UN Convention on 
State Immunity,112 only one State, namely Switzerland, has formally taken the position that the said 
treaty is without prejudice to developments in international law as to pecuniary compensation for 
human rights violations, 113 while Italy, when ratifying the Convention, more generally, merely 
referred to the necessity to interpret the treaty in line with human rights law.114 This acceptance, by 
the vast majority of ratifying European States, of the 2004 Convention, which does not contain a jus 
cogens or some other form of human rights exception, once again confirms the general European 
perspective on the matter, as outlined above. It is even more telling that six of those ratifying 
European States have done so after the ICJ judgment in the Jurisdictional Immunities case between 
Germany versus Italy had been rendered115 – and they did so without entering any reservation or 
formal declaration as to the ‘conservative’ interpretation of the current status of the rules of State 
immunity by the ICJ. 
4. Possible legal implications of the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court for 
European military operations 
Turning to possible legal implications of the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court for 
European military operations, i.e. in particular for military operations under the auspices of the 
European Union, it should first be noted that it is highly unlikely that European armed forces and 
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their members will commit violations of international humanitarian law amounting to violations of 
jus cogens akin to the war crimes that gave rise to the jurisprudence of the Italian courts in the first 
place. Hence, most probably, the issue of a possible jus cogens exception will, hopefully, remain a 
mere academic issue, when it comes to the realities of current European military operations. 
Besides, and that is a somewhat more difficult question to answer, it is secondly doubtful whether 
the result reached by the ICJ in its 2012 judgment confirming State immunity for belligerent acts116 
would also apply to activities of armed forces not amounting to the participation in an armed 
conflict as a belligerent party, but rather, for example, to acts as part of a peacekeeping operation. 
This would then bring back the issue of the scope and status under customary law of the foreign 
tort exception. It ought to be, however, again noted that several European States, including Italy, 
have taken the position that the reverse armed forces exception to the foreign tort exception 
should be broadly defined including as covering all forms of military activities, even those beyond 
the scope of armed conflicts.117 
In any case, any debate as to the issue of the extent of State immunity when it comes to ‘European’ 
military operations would, obviously, first and foremost and as a preliminary matter, have to tackle 
the issue of attribution118. If ‘European’ military operations, undertaken under the auspices of the 
European Union, were to be attributed to either the European Union as such, or in the case of an 
underlying mandate by the UN Security Council to the United Nations119 in line with the however 
somewhat problematic jurisprudence of the ECHR in the Behrami/Saramati case,120 the question of 
State responsibility would obviously not arise. Yet, as the domestic proceedings in the Netherlands 
concerning the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina have confirmed, 
mutatis mutandis, parallel issues as to the immunity of international organizations might 
nevertheless come to light.121 It ought to be noted, however, that the ‘Protocol on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the European Union’, annexed to the Treaty of Nice,122 does not, as such, provide for 
a general immunity of the European Union at least when it comes to civil proceedings for damages 
brought before civil courts of one of the member States of the European Union. 
If one were to assume, however, that acts of military operations led by the European Union were to 
be, at least also, attributable to the troop contributing member States of the European Union, as 
was inter alia the position taken by German Courts concerning military operations off the coast of 
Somalia within the framework of the operation EUNAVFOR,123 no specific issues of State immunity 
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arise. Rather, the respective troop-contributing State would be entitled to enjoy State immunity 
exactly to the same degree as in any kind of unilateral military operations. It is again interesting to 
note that Italy, when ratifying the 2004 UN Convention on State Immunity, has expressly reiterated 
that, in its view, the Convention does not set aside “special immunity regimes, including the ones 
concerning the status of armed forces and associated personnel following the armed forces”124 and, 
it is submitted, this is completely in line with customary law. Accordingly, given that European 
armed forces would, at least in most cases including those like Afghanistan, where they are 
involved in actual fighting, act within the framework of a status of forces agreement concluded with 
the territorial State specifically providing for the immunity of the respective European State, the 
issue would be moot since any such European State involved in a military operation would then 
continue to be entitled to full-fledged immunity as a matter of treaty law. 
Besides, to the extent that a domestic court of the territorial State, with which a status of forces 
agreement has been concluded providing for immunity, would have to decide the matter, setting 
aside such treaty-based immunity would not only require to argue that there is no State immunity 
in such cases. Rather, it would also have to argue that the alleged customary rule setting aside 
State immunity in case of alleged war crimes was in and of itself also of a jus cogens character. 
Such argument, while being in line with the general thrust of the judgment of the Italian 
Constitutional Court,125 would, however, then necessarily assume another bold step not supported 
by actual State practice. 
In any case, it is worth noting that at least when it comes to European military operations in the 
strict sense, i.e. those undertaken under the auspices of the European Union rather than 
operations within the framework of NATO involving European States, the respective status of forces 
agreements concluded by the European Union provide as a matter of routine for an individual right 
to seize a claims commission, followed by some form of arbitration. For example the “Agreement 
between the European Union and the Republic of Uganda on the Status of the European Union-led 
Mission in Uganda”,126 regulating the legal status of EUTM Somalia in Uganda, while confirming in 
its Art. 5 para. 3 that EUTM Somalia “shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process” at the 
same time provides in its Art. 15 for the set-up of a claims commission, where claims by individuals 
can be brought, as well as for the creation of an arbitral tribunal, should the claims process 
arguably fail to adequately address alleged individual damages. 
In such a scenario the last resort argument, as submitted by Italy in the ICJ proceedings brought by 
Germany,127 and somewhat also reflected in the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court here 
under consideration,128 would be of no relevance anymore, given the alternative to setting aside 
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State immunity. In most situations of deployment of troops under the auspices of the European 
Union, the issue underlying the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court is thus somewhat of a 
mere academic nature. 
5. Further perspectives after Sentenza 238 
Obviously, the unfortunate approach chosen by the Italian Constitutional Court of, at least de facto, 
disregarding the international legal obligations of Italy to implement a binding judgment of an 
international court or tribunal, claiming a violation of domestic constitutional law, is not unique. It 
suffices to refer to the 2008 judgment of the US Supreme Court in Medellín v. Texas129 (setting aside 
the effects of the ICJ judgment in Avena 130 ), or the more recent decision of the Russian 
Constitutional Court in the Yukos case. 131  Just like the German Constitutional Court, which 
unfortunately had in the past, be it only as a matter of principled approach, mutatis mutandis 
chosen the collision course with the European Court of Justice132 and later the European Court of 
Human Rights,133 the course chosen by the Italian Constitutional Court has, however, not – or rather 
not yet at least – led to a concrete collision with the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 
Such collision would only occur if concrete steps were now to be taken to execute judgments for 
damages against German State property located in Italy and where Germany were to then start 
renewed proceedings before the ICJ which could possibly lead to yet another ICJ judgment most 
probably reconfirming the ICJ’s 2012 judgment – yet hopefully such collision can be avoided. 
This leads to the almost philosophical question whether the redress awarded by domestic (Italian) 
courts ‘as long as’ neither the German nor the international system grant equivalent protection to 
the victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during World War II is 
necessary or at least tolerable. For one, this raises the issue whether indeed such individual claims 
do exist in the first place as a matter of the current international lex lata, which, one might say, is 
doubtful. What is more is that, even if that were the case, such individual claims might have not 
either been satisfied under previous inter-State agreements, or been subject to some other form of 
prescription one way or the other. 
While these questions would, however, go beyond the scope of this contribution, one has to ask 
more broadly, whether, at the current stage of international law, and currently prevailing political 
developments, it truly makes sense to try to take bold steps such as recognizing an individual right 
to compensation for such violations (and even where such violations have been committed more 
than 60 years ago) combined with denying the State concerned State immunity. The Pandora Box 
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argument, while having been repeated time and again,134 is obvious: does it really make sense – to 
provide but one example and there are many more – to e.g. have Georgian courts decide cases 
against the Russian Federation for alleged violations of international humanitarian law during the 
2008 armed conflict – and then obviously also vice versa – with almost ‘automatic’, yet completely 
contrary, results on the merits? Should one really consider that to constitute an improvement of 
the international legal order, and would such a development truly foster the international rule of 
law? 
Rather, the way forward would be to, be it only for future cases, enlarge and strengthen the 
jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, either those that provide access to individuals or 
that have some form of compulsory jurisdiction, and the European Convention for the Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes certainly forms part of such attempt, which as might be recalled, could not 
be invoked by Italy as a jurisdictional basis for its counter-claim for reasons ratione temporis.135 Put 
otherwise: if a similar scenario of violations of international humanitarian law was to arise again 
today between two or more of the contracting parties of the said Convention, and it is hoped that 
this will not happen, the underlying interstate case for damages could be brought, and rightly so, 
before the ICJ. It is submitted that this might be the right way forward. 
In the same vein, providing for claims commissions where even individual compensation might be 
sought for violations of international humanitarian law might also be a useful and appropriate 
mechanism, provided the parties involved are indeed able and willing to follow up on such 
process.136 
This leads to the last question, namely what lessons ought to be learned when it comes to a 
possible dialogue between domestic, and namely constitutional courts on the one hand, and 
international courts on the other. In the author’s understanding, international courts not only 
constitute a cornerstone, but also a capstone of the construction of international law. Once such 
capstone is being removed or damaged – and unfortunately we currently see many instances, 
benevolent or not, to that effect throughout the World – the danger arises that the whole edifice if 
not collapses, at least might show cracks. Hence, every attempt should be made not to question 
their authority even more so since such international judicial institutions by their very nature have 
the clear advantage to be by far further away from domestic political pressures, moods and 
feelings. 
In summary, one might say that European States, as well as European (constitutional) courts should 
not take Frank Sinatra too much at face value, who once stated in his song ‘My Way’ that he did not 
act ‘in a shy way’, and that he ‘had to say the things he truly felt’, and not ‘the words of one who 
kneels’, and that ‘the record therefore showed that he had to take the blows’ in order to ‘do it my 
way’.137 Domestic courts, and even more so the highest courts of democratic and rule-based 
countries do not only have a responsibility for their own constitutional order, but also more 
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broadly speaking for the international legal order. Hence, such courts, but also Europe more 
generally, should try to avoid deciding matters of State immunity ‘their own way’ because the blow 
would then not only expose themselves, but would threaten to undermine international law and 
the international rule of law at large. 
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